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The United States Congress and Internal Reform
Robert F. Sittig*
In this article Professor Sittig examines the methods by which the
United States Congress has attempted to modernize and democratize
its procedures. The article traces the steps of internal reform from the
early attempts to improve the committee system, through the modern
day efforts to control the filibuster. He concludes that additional reform
measures are needed in order that the Congress remain a flexible and
responsive body.
I. INMRODUCrON
It has now been twenty years since the United States altered its
internal machinery in a comprehensive attempt at modernization. Its
willingness, in 1946, to adopt most of the changes suggested by a con-
gressional study committee indicated the timeliness of that reorgani-
zation. The basic areas changed were: standing committees (size,
jurisdiction, membership and operating procedures); regulation of
lobby groups; coordination and supervision of fiscal affairs; and the
bringing of professional research staffs to Congress. Most of these
modifications were quickly implemented after passage of the act.' Of
those given a trial, many met the test of time and have become a part
of the permanent body of rules and practices of Congress.2 Since that
time, additional piecemeal reform of certain controversial practices in
the Congress has produced a desirable effect on the responsiveness of
that body. What follows will be a review of the developments which
led to the adoption of some of the more effective and enduring
changes.
II. THE JOIMsON R=rE
The importance of standing committees in the operation of the
United States Congress is nowhere under-emphasized by students of
government.3 The committee stage in the life of a bill is crucial and
the influence of legislators largely centers around their committee
activities. In recognition of this factor, the 1946 act opened up addi-
tional leadership positions on some committees by limiting member-
ship to a single committee assignment in the House and to two in the
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska.
1. Pub. L. No. 601, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 2, 1946). Some provisions (e.g.,
preparation of a legislatve budget) proved unworkable and have been quietly for-
gotten.
2. For a comprehensive review on the results of this act see Galloway, The Opera-
tion of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 45 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 41-68 (1951).
3. Political scientists often refer to them as "miniature legislatures," implying they
actually serve as free agents for the parent body.
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Senate. The intended effect was to reduce the number of important
posts held by a handful of leaders in each party.4 Those legislators
holding multiple assignments had to make difficult choices as to
which committee (s) they preferred. This, in turn, made advancement
possible for others who were lower on the seniority ladder. Such
modification has had a desirable effect on the democratization of
leadership posts in congressional committees.
In 1953, Lyndon Johnson, fresh in his job as Senate Democratic
Leader, was instrumental in establishing an additional standard for
the initial assignment of newly-elected Democratic Senators.5 In es-
sence this innovation guaranteed each new Democratic Senator a top
committee assignment before any other Democrat would receive a
second important assignment. 6 This practice has now hardened into
precedent and is referred to as the Johnson Rule. Evidently, it has
been of sufficient importance to withstand the transfer of the party's
leadership from Senator Johnson to Senator Mansfield since it is still
in effect.
The stimulus behind this innovation is clouded and one might guess
it was a condition or pledge to which Senator Johnson agreed upon his
assumption of the party helm. Regardless, one can recognize the
practical effect it has had on eliminating the so-called "silent" first
term for newly elected Democratic Senators.8 Formerly freshman
Senators were permitted to vacate their less important committee posts
only as they accumulated seniority. This process still prevails to some
extent in the Republican party in the Senate and to a greater extent in
both parties in the House. The Johnson Rule, however, changed this
for Senate Democrats and Table I provides a comparative analysis of
its effect on initial assignments of all freshman Senators in each Con-
gress from 1953-1965 (83d-89th).
4. The most sought after position on a committee is, of course, that of chairman.
The ranking minority spot and those directly beneath these two seats are also recognized
to be of influence.
5. The actual assignment (and transfer) of legislators to committees is a highly
secretive and intriguing process. For the best recent treatment of this practice see
Masters, Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives, 55 Amr. PoL. ScI.
Rv. 345-57 (1961).
6. There is no formal ranking of standing committees into major and minor categories.
However, custom has elevated certain ones (e.g., finance, appropritations, foreign re-
lations and military affairs) to commanding heights in terms of prestige, covetousness
and permanence of membership. In the same way, other committees are considered to
be of slight importance (e.g., District of Columbia, civil service, post office and ad-
ministration).
7. See Goodwin, The Seniority System in Congress, 53 Am. POL. Sc. REv. 416, 432
(1959).
8. The folklore of the United States Senate supposedly dictates that legislators are
to be seen rather than heard during their first term. See Mathews, The Folkways of the
U.S. Senate: Conformity to Group Norms and Legislative Effectiveness, 53 Amt. PoL.
Sci. REv. 1065-89 (1959).
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*In the absence of any formal rankings of Senate committees the author has
grouped them as follows:
High-Appropriations; Armed Services; Finance; Foreign Relations; and
Judiciary.
Medium-Aeronautical and Space Sciences; Agriculture and Forestry; Bank-
ing and Currency; Interior and Insular Affairs; Interstate and Foreign
Commerce; Labor and Public Welfare.
Low-District of Columbia; Government Operations; Post Office and Civil
Service; Public Works; and Rules and Administration.
I
Ranking [ 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 TotalsII I I I IIIII
Medium
Low
No. % No. %JNo. %No. % No.% No. % No. %INo. %
Dem. 2 141 5 24 1 5 10 26 2 11 4 21 2 12 26 17
Rep. 1 4 1 8 0 - 1 14 0 - 0 -- 0 - 3 4
Dem. 3 22 8 38 11 55 17 43 12 63 7 37 9 53 67 45
Rep. 12 48 3 25 1 10 2 29 3 33 10 77 2 67 33 42
Dem. 9 64 8 38 8 40 12 31 5 26 8 42 6 35 56 38
Rep. 12 48 8 67 9 90 4 57 6 67 3 23 1 33 43 54
Totals Dem. 14 100 21 100 20 100 39 100 19 100 19 100 17 100 149 100Rep. 25 100 12 100 10 100 7 100 9 100 13 100 3 100 79 100
During this period twenty-six freshmen Democrats were given a
seat on a top committee for at least one of their first assignments. The
comparable figure for the Republican freshmen is only three. Some
caution is perhaps necessary since there were fewer openings for Re-
publicans to fill due to their declining numbers in the Senate during
this interim. The more meaningful percentages, however, verify the
same basic finding, that is, that Democratic freshmen could look for-
ward to receiving more favorable committee assignments than could
their colleagues in the Republican party. The same general pattern
is evident in assignments made to medium and low level committees
although the differences are less pronounced. This means that Demo-
crats, generally, and some individual Democrats specifically, will have
a much improved opportunity to assume future leadership positions
Table 19
INITIAL COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS OF FRESHMEN
U.S. SENATORS, 1953-1965,
9. For a slightly different ranking, see Goodwin, supra note 7, at 433.
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than will their Republican counterparts; and they will probably
achieve them in a much shorter period of time since they have a
significant head start.
The beneficial effect which the Johnson Rule has brought to the
Senate is partially the result of another separate but related develop-
ment. In Congress, in recent years, there has been a rapid growth of
subcommittees beneath the full standing committees. 10 More and
more, these bodies are becoming miniature committees themselves.
Their decisions are being accepted and ratified by the full committee
in the same way recommendations formerly made by full committees
were ratified by the entire Congress. The Johnson Rule now makes
it possible for some of these additional posts to be filled by legislators
with low seniority who nevertheless may possess talents which need
not be stifled by the system.
At the same time this trend toward greater specialization through
subcommittees has been taking place, it is also evident that committee
chairmen, for the most part, have been willing to appoint some of
these younger Democrats as chairmen of these groups. The seniority
system in subcommittee affairs is not customarily as vital in determin-
ing protocol matters and this allows for consideration of other attri-
butes such as experience, training and ability in their establishment
and operation. In the years since 1952 a number of Democrats, all
with four years or less seniority, have actually headed various sub-
committees, and a few have been given these posts in their first year
of service. For instance, in 1955 Senator Symington chaired a sub-
committee of the Armed Services Committee on stockpiling of strategic
resources. His interests and activities in this field of public policy
remain vibrant today. Senator Scott of North Carolina chaired one of
the commodity (Tobacco) subcommittees of the Agriculture Com-
mittee; Senator Proxmire was chairman of a Small Business subcom-
mittee of the Banking Committee; and Senators Church, J. Kennedy
and Mansfield all were given chairmanships on Foreign Relations sub-
committees. Thus, an important corollary to the Johnson Rule has
now developed, and both tend to blunt the full effects of the seniority
system in making committee assignments. One can, without reserva-
tion, recommend that this improvement be given greater emphasis by
Senate Republicans as well as by both parties in the House of Repre-
sentatives." The Johnson Rule is a logical updating of the provision
on committee assignments in the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act.
10. For an extensive study of this trend see Goodwin, Subcommittees: The Miniature
Legislatures of Congress, 56 Am. POL. SCL REv. 596-604 (1962). Goodwin also notes
that a few committee chairmen have resisted this trend since they oppose greater dis-
persion of their authority.
11. For example, no freshman Democrat in the House of Representatives has been
assigned to the Ways and Means Committee in the last half-century.
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It is, in addition, a partially corrective device for dealing with the
difficult problem of the proper use of seniority in a democratic and
deliberative assembly.
12
III. Tim HOUSE RULES Co MrrE
Over the years the United States House of Representatives has, at
times, been faced with controversial rules and practices which have
not always been fully amenable to majority control. In recent sessions,
this has been the case with the House Rules Committee. The formal
function assigned to this committee has supposedly been procedural
rather than substantive. Other committees consider legislation deal-
ing with a particular functional area (agriculture, taxation, public
works, etc.), but the House Rules Committee has been assigned the
role of clearing the agenda. Operating in accordance with this role,
it is supposedly similar to a traffic policeman, directing vehicles
through a busy intersection. The long and precarious step from theory
to practice is rarely better illustrated than in the case of the House
Rules Committee. At the busy intersection, the assumption is that all
traffic ultimately is given the "go" signal and proceeds. This same
notion is implied in the operation of this Committee. As bills clear
the other standing committees, this body channels them to the floor
and recommends the conditions (time limit for debate, amendments,
etc.) under which they will be considered. In a growing number of
recent instances, however, the Rules Committee became a dead end
for many important measures. This was possible because a "technical"
majority of its members often were opposed to the substance of cer-
tain bills and thus prevented adoption of a rule to cover floor debate.
13
These deviations of the Rules Committee became so pronounced
that opposition finally developed which was sufficient to reduce its
power.14 The most enduring criticism regarding the group concerned
its sporadic thwarting of the will of the majority (in this sense the
majority of some other standing committee). In a series of corrective
moves, the Rules Committee has been relegated to a position more
in keeping with its intended role. The first recent step in this direction
came in 1959 when a number of middle-ranking House Democrats
openly attempted to curtail the power of the Committee. It took the
12. Stuart Udall discusses the question of seniority in A Defense of the Seniority
System, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1957, § 6 (Magazine), p. 11. Udall was then a mem-
ber of Congress.
13. The influence this group had come to wield in the House of Representatives is
discussed at length in Robinson, THE HousE Ru. Es Co MTTEE (1963).
14. This commentary picks up the record of the Rules Committee in recent times
and passes over earlier modifications. In 1910, the Speaker of the House was removed




commanding influence of Speaker Rayburn to calm the waters. In
seeking to avert a rupture in his party, he made a personal pledge to
ensure against further apostasy by Rules Committee Democrats. This
promise satisfied those pushing for a showdown and they adopted
a "wait and see" attitude during the 86th Congress.15 In one of those
rare instances when statesmen miscalculate, Rayburn's influence was
evidently not sufficient to keep the democratic process fully open in
this body.16 This development set the stage for the opening session of
the 87th Congress.
In 1961, spurred on by the victory of a Democratic President, those
House Democrats anxious for change began their efforts anew. After
strategy consultations, they decided a temporary increase in the size
of the Rules Committee would result in a partial solution. In an ex-
tremely close vote (217-212)-which came after a great deal of
intrigue, including a twenty-four-hour postponement of the vote-the
committee was increased from twelve to fifteen seats. The Democrats
were to receive two of these additional seats.17 Leakage on both sides
of the aisle occurred, but twenty-two Republican bolters were sufficient
to compensate for the sixty-four Democrats who deserted their
leaders. 18 Passage meant that a different informal working majority
could be coalesced within the committee since it was assumed the
Republicans would add another "regular" to increase their potential
to seven votes. But with the two Democratic seats going to "admini-
stration" supporters their total strength would be eight votes.
The skillful strategy of the proponents was largely reflected in the
record of the Rules Committee in the 87th Congress. Measures in-
corporating programs which had earlier experienced great difficulty
now cleared the group with regularity. However, certain issues were
sufficiently disruptive to cause a breakdown in the precarious voting
majority, resulting in the stalling of some major proposals. 10 For the
most part, the committee was clearly reduced in power and its capacity
to delay and perhaps kill proposals was limited accordingly. An indi-
15. 17 CONG. Q. WEmLY REP. 45 (Jan. 9, 1959).
16. Some of the important measures which were blocked, delayed or revised during
the 86th Congress by the Rules Committee were: school construction; civil rights; and
aid to depressed areas.
17. The most frequent vote on stalled measures in the Rules Committee usually
came after two of the eight Democrats joined with the four Republicans to form a
deadlocking tie vote group. In legislative proceedings tie votes result in neither victory
nor defeat. In these cases it left the measures hanging in midair as adjournment moved
ever nearer.
18. Speaker Rayburn is said to have remarked that this dispute was the "worst fight
of my life."
19. Certain "administration" Democrats did not vote to clear bills involving federal-
state-local powers and separation of church and state. This stopped proposals dealing
with city mass transit systems; aid to education; creation of an Urban Affairs Depart-
ment; and establishment of youth employment camps (Job Corps).
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cation of the general satisfaction with this temporary reform is evident
in the 1963 vote to make permanent the increased size of the Rules
Committee. The slender margin of the earlier vote disappeared and
the measure passed comfortably (235-196). A few more Republicans
voted for this proposal than had previously been the case. The most
obvious shift came in the Democratic ranks where the bolters were
reduced by nearly twenty votes.
20
During the organizational proceedings in 1965, a further limitation
on the jurisdiction of the Rules Committee was approved.21 For those
who might not have anticipated this alteration, in light of the improved
condition between 1960 and 1964, an even greater surprise ensued
during the session. One of the approved changes revived and extended
a device which makes more effective the discharge rule, whereby any
committee, if it fails to act on a bill, can be relieved of its jurisdiction
over the measure. The House members voted to lodge more directly
the responsibility for activating the discharge rule with those leaders
(floor and committee) who originally sponsored any bill which be-
comes stalled. The result was that on six occasions during the session
the Rules Committee was summarily excused from its task of clearing
these measures for floor consideration. 2 The most enduring aspects
of these developments are first, the fact that with one exception all
these bills were subsequently passed on the floor; and second, that
four of the six discharges came during a single legislative day.23 There
remained at the end of the session some measures still languishing in
the House Rules Committee but they were of minor importance. The
immediate struggle had been resolved, for the most part, in favor of
the Democratic party leaders.
Internal reform has thus lowered another hurdle in the Con-
gress. In this case reform occurred in the House of Representatives.
20. Perhaps the most interesting shift took place in the Democratic delegation from
Georgia. In 1961 this group voted eight to two against the increase. In 1963 all ten
voted for the permanent increase. It has been suggested that the switch resulted from
an agreement by the leaders to look favorably upon committee assignment requests.
See Robert Peabody, The Enlarged Rules Committee, in Nmw PERsPECTIVEs ON Trl
HousE OF REPREENTATiVEs 160 (Peabody & Polsby eds. 1963).
21. See 23 CoNG. Q. WRE _y REP. 31 (Jan 8, 1966) for an account of the passage
and provisions of this rules change. A provision regarding the acceptance of House-
Senate conference committee reports went unused during the first session of the 89th
Congress. These changes were largely the result of the continuing reform efforts of
the House Democratic Study Group, a recently established rival party body which
claims the support of from 75-100 House Democrats from the liberal wing of the party.
22. The measures were in their approximate order of importance: Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act; repeal of Taft-Hartley "right-to-work" provision; government
employees pay raise; school construction aid for disaster areas; establishment of a
National Humanities Foundation; and a Banking Act amendment dealing with mergers.
23. This stormy session was one of the longest legislative days (12 hours) on
record in the House. The ramifications from the struggle will undoubtedly not be
lightly dismissed or easily forgotten. See 111 CONG. REC. 22749-64 (Sept. 13, 1965).
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It has an especial responsibility to reflect the wishes of the majority
since it is constitutionally apportioned on a basis of population. De-
spite this high ideal, instances have been recorded when majority
rule has been shunted. The reduced power of the House Rules Com-
mittee lessens the likelihood that this condition may again develop
in the House of Representatives. 24
IV. THE. SENATE FIIBusTER
Another practice which has come to be regarded by many as a
dilatory tactic bordering on being undemocratic is the Senate fili-
buster. This device can, at times, be effectively used to prevent or
delay Senate action. Criticism of the filibuster is somewhat unwar-
ranted since the Senate Rules specifically provide a means for limiting
debate. Even so, this is rarely possible in practice, and thus the fili-
buster can be used as a vehicle by those seeking a delay.2 Recogni-
tion of this dilemma tends to put the filibuster in a category with the
House Rules Committee. That is, fonnal procedures provide that a
majority of the House may decide what conditions ought to cover
the final debate stage of a measure. The likelihood, however, of a
majority of the House taking this course of action is remote and has
the practical effect of deflating this possible remedy. In a similar
fashion, Senate Rules permit the majority (an extraordinary one of
two-thirds of those voting) to invoke cloture and limit debate. But
the history of this Rule (XXII) indicates that formal efforts to halt
debate have been largely ineffective.
The provision covering the limitation of debate is actually but a
half-century old. It was adopted after a handful of Senators "talked
to death" President Wilson's proposal to arm merchant ships in the
period prior to United States entry into World War I. From that time
until 1962, twenty-two attempts to halt debate failed, while only four
similar efforts were successful.26 This record indicates the degree of
difficulty involved in halting a filibuster. In part, this is due to the
fact that some Senators look upon unlimited debate as a hallmark of
democracy, and are opposed to curbing it regardless of the issue
24. This also makes less disturbing the implication behind the remark made by a
Republican recently appointed to the House Rules Committee. He said he would not
be an obstructionist but he did intend to vote against clearing legislation "which I am
very much against."
25. In full operation the filibuster is conducted with snail-like progress since the
legislative process affords many opportunities for dilatory tactics. With a premium on
time, the leadership is then tempted to extend the legislative day (and perhaps con-
vene around-the-clock sessions) to wear down those controlling the floor. Those lead-
ing the filibuster retaliate by asking for quorum counts at the most inopportune times.
26. The record was even more dismal in the field of civil rights. Not a single
limitation had been agreed to in eleven attempts.
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under consideration.27 Others may be opposed to the particular mea-
sure being considered and vote against cloture motions so that the
proponents will perhaps be forced to amend or withdraw the bill. In
addition, many Senators from less populous states tend to look upon
unlimited debate as a balancing device in the same sense that Senate
representation is based upon the principle of equality of the states.
The combined effect is that almost all cloture attempts find a fluctuat-
ing but significant portion of the Senate unsympathetic to restricting
debate. And when the issue at hand takes on additional importance
(e.g., civil rights, federal-state powers) the prospect for limitation
is very dim.
However, it appears that the potential power of the filibuster has
undergone a distinct reduction in recent years. A standoff resulted
from action taken in the 81st Congress (1949) which was subsequently
revoked in the 86th Congress (1959). The 81st Congress had in-
creased the majority necessary to halt debate from two-thirds of
those voting to two-thirds of the entire membership.28 In 1959, this
majority was reduced to the earlier level-two-thirds of those voting.
Those seeking a further reduction in the voting majority were not
satisfied with this slight change, and have continued to press for a
further relaxation in each subsequent Congress.
During organizational proceedings in the 87th Congress (1961),
the debate on the adoption of the existing rules was intense. Those
seeking a smaller majority vote (i.e., three-fifths, or a simple majority)
engaged in a "filibuster" type slowdown of their own. After a delay
of seven days the proposed change-calling for a reduced majority
of three-fifths to halt debate-was referred to the Senate Rules Com-
mittee by a narrow vote (50-46) .29 A measure incorporating this
standard was ultimately reported back at the end of the session as
Majority Leader Mansfield had originally promised. However, the
hour was late, a brief filibuster ensued, cloture was voted down and
the matter was postponed-a silent but nonetheless effective way of
killing the proposal.
In 1963, at the opening of the 88th Congress, the proponents were
more determined than ever. Again, a proposal to reduce the necessary
margin to three-fifths failed, and the matter was finally disposed of
27. A Southern Senator recently remarked he would not vote in favor of any cloture
motion until the "shrimps start to whistling Dixie."
28. Invariably, at least a handful of Senators are absent due to campaign trips, over-
seas conferences, illness, etc., and this factor did not escape those behind this change
in 1949.
29. 107 CoNG. REc. 625 (Jan. 11, 1961). An earlier study in 1957-1958 by an ad hoc
Rules subcommittee composed of Senators Talmadge (Dem., Ga.) and Javits (Rep.,
N.Y.) was unsuccessful since they were unable to agree on a possible solution. The
Senate Rules Committee is not involved in determining the agenda of the Senate as is
the case with the Rules Committee in the House.
19661
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
after a one-month delay.3° During this period the Senate had been
so incapacitated that business had slowed to a trickle. In the cur-
rent Congress (89th), final action regarding any formal change of
the rule has not, as yet, been completed. Some prediction is possible
since the Senate Rules Committee recommended (5-4) in 1965 the
retention of the existing rule, after proposals identical to those con-
sidered in previous sessions were again referred for its study and pos-
sible action. Conceivably, these proposals could be revived at any
time on the Senate floor during this session, but this is quite unlikely.
If Rule XXII is to be changed it will probably come after the Senate
receives the recommendations of its Rules Committee which is cur-
rently studying all Senate floor procedures for possible revision.31
Although formal changes have not occurred, a weakening effect is
evident regarding the current importance of the filibuster. Perhaps
the first step in this direction came in the second session of the 87th
Congress. The proposal being considered authorized the development
of a communications satellite system through a specially created pri-
vate corporation. The prospect of such a strategic project being turned
over to private enterprise (with limited governmental control and
supervision) was unacceptable to some Senators. They launched a
filibuster to slow the pace of the bill and perhaps even reverse its
obvious direction.32 The climax came quickly, however, when cloture
was approved by a narrow three vote margin, a margin which failed
to reflect truly the overwhelming support behind the communica-
tions satellite bill. This event marked but the fifth time, and the
first time since 1927, that cloture had been invoked. Then in 1964, this
time in the field of civil rights, cloture was again approved. Although
limitation of debate on civil rights measures often had been at-
tempted, it had never been successful. Adept handling of the bill by
the majority leadership had been instrumental in even getting the
measure to the floor.33 After three months of tedious delay, history
30. 110 CONG. REc. 2058 (Feb. 7, 1963).
31. The seeming inability of the proponents of change to achieve success is both
surprising and somewhat disturbing as far as the principle of majority rule is concerned.
In 1963, the then Senator Humphrey claimed he had the signatures of fifty-one (an
absolute majority) Senators who favored lower cloture requirements. They are, how-
ever, evidently unable to agree upon a precise standard for any new rule.
32. Those conducting the slowdown were mildly ridiculed for their inconsistency
since they were largely the same ones who were pressing for a watered-down cloture
rule. However, in 1964, their strategy worked as they filibustered to death the at-
tempts by some Senators to overturn the decisions of the Supreme Court requiring the
apportionment of legislative bodies solely on the basis of population.
33. The bill was not referred to a standing committee after its introduction. This
deviates from precedent long established. Majority Leader Mansfield managed to
have the proposal placed directly on the floor calendar after House passage had been
completed. This move avoided the graveyard which the Senate Judiciary Committee
seemed to represent.
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was dramatically made when the Senate voted to limit debate. Shortly
thereafter, the civil rights bill passed by a 73-27 margin. Once this
watershed had been cleared, the subsequent approval of cloture in
1965 (for the third time in four years), on another civil rights bill,
was largely anti-climactic.34
The implication appears clear. Another barrier which has impeded
the orderly consideration of legislative proposals has been largely
eliminated. Thus, the democratization of the committee assignment
process in the United States Senate; the lowering of the influence of
the House Rules Committee; and the increased prospect of curbing
Senate filibusters have all contributed to an improved image for the
United States Congress. This new image is one which includes a
greater responsiveness to majority rule in internal congressional pro-
ceedings. During this era of expanding executive power and prestige,
those who watch over the democratic process would be remiss if they
let these healthy developments pass unheralded.
V. RECENT REFOmrVt ACIviTIEs
Although piecemeal reform has brought some beneficial changes to
the Congress, there have been frequent suggestions in recent years
for creation of another general study group similar to the earlier Joint
Committee on the Organization of the Congress. Most, but not all, of
these suggestions have come from outside the body. Among those
within Congress who have been closely identified with legislative
reform, the names of Senator Clark (Dem., Pa.) and Representative
Boiling (Dem., Mo.) stand out. In 1963, a resolution sponsored by
Senator Clark, with twenty-nine co-sponsors, proposed the establish-
ment of a study committee. This resolution was amended by the
Senate Rules Committee and reported favorably late in the session.
The amendment, however, removed from the jurisdiction of the pro-
posed committee any authority to recommend alteration of the internal
rules, precedents, or floor procedures in either House. The revision
was unacceptable to Senator Clark, and he attempted to have the
proviso eliminated from the resolution. He was unable to coalesce
sufficient support to do this, however, and the result was a standoff.
This ended floor action on reform for the 88th Congress.
The effect of the election in 1964 strengthened the position of those
seeking reform. Senator Monroney (Dem., Okla.), rather than Senator
34. On the other side of the ledger, however, is the use of the filbuster to oppose
the repeal of the "right-to-work" provision of the Taft-Hartley Act. On three occasions
in the 89th Congress (once in 1965; twice in 1966) the strategy of delay by those
opposed to repeal has proved effective and cloture measures have failed of adoption.
Thus, the particular issue being debated will probably be of prime importance when
any future attempts are made to halt debate and bring a measure to a final vote.
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Clark, introduced a similar resolution in 1965, and was joined by fifty-
four co-sponsors. Senator Monroney avoided any renewal of the
earlier conflict by accepting the more limited scope for the proposed
committee. By unanimous vote, the Senate later approved this resolu-
tion. The House of Representatives gave its approval and the Joint
Committee on the Organization of the Congress was authorized. 35
The Joint Committee consisted of twelve members equally divided
between Senators and Representatives, as well as between Democrats
and Republicans.36 It was directed to "make a complete study of the
organization and operation of the Congress of the United States . . .
with a view toward strengthening the Congress ... ." The top positions
on the Committee went to Senator Monroney and Representative
Madden (Dem., Ind.). Both carried the designation of co-chairman,
although in organizational sessions the members agreed Senator
Monroney was to act as presiding officer.1 The other members repre-
sented a delicate blending between young and old, liberal and con-
servative, east and west.3
In its initial operating sessions the joint Committee had to decide
on the precise limit of its jurisdiction and also had to retain a research
staff. On the point of jurisdiction, they decided that the original
limitation applied only to the actual recommendation, and not to the
mere study, of proposals dealing with internal floor rules and prac-
tices.39 The agreement reached on the hiring of a professional staff
35. S. Con. Res. 2, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
36. Senator Case (Rep., N.J.) who also has been prominent in congressional reform
activities was unsuccessful in having private citizens included on the study group.
This would have had the effect of making the body more of a commission. Also, the
equal distribution of seats between each House on joint committees avoids any in-
voking of claims of greater prestige by either chamber, while a degree of bipartisan-
ship is enhanced through the elevation of the minority party to a level of equal repre-
sentation.
37. Senator Monroney also served on the 1946 study group as head of the House
contingent. He later was elected to the Senate and his earlier service no doubt proved
valuable.
38. The other Democrats were: Senators Sparkman (Ala.) and Metcalf (Mont.);
and Representatives Brooks (Tex.) and Hechler (W. Va.). The Republican mem-
bers were: Senators Mundt (S.D.), Case (N.J.) and Boggs (Del.); and Repre-
sentatives Curtis (Mo.), Griffin (Mich.) and Hall (Mo.). Representative Griffin later
resigned his seat in the House to accept appointment to the Senate; he was replaced by
Representative Cleveland (N.H.). Interestingly, those most closely identified with the
reform movement (e.g., Clark, Boiling) were not selected. The single trait most of
the members seemed to possess was that of being allied with the party leadership in
their respective chambers. See 23 CONG. Q. WEEaL REP. 422 (March 19, 1965).
39. Perhaps this working interpretation is not as "liberal" as it might first appear.
For instance, the Senate had earlier in the session instructed its regular Rules Commit-
tee to review all Senate procedures and to recommend appropriate revisions. Thus,
any Joint Committee proposals in this area would be duplicative. In addition, study
alone might be helpful to individual committee members who could then push for
whatever changes they prefer. The distinction here is that proposals with but in-
dividual support are less likely to be considered on the floor than are those which have
Joint Committee sponsorship.
CONGRESS AND INTERNAL REFORM
demonstrates well the legislative propensity for balance and modera-
tion. Each of the four contingents was allowed to fill a single staff
position. The result was that a political scientist; a lawyer; a former
House member (and previously a committee staff counsel); and a
former staff member on a federal commission were retained. Since
the committee members were not relieved of their usual legislative
duties, the staff personnel carried a considerable portion of the com-
mittee's workload.
During the 89th Congress, the Joint Committee conducted its public
hearings. First other Congressmen (17 Senators and 59 Representa-
tives), then lobbyists from a number of the large interest groups, and
finally the executive and legislative staff experts gave their views to
the study committee. Proposals were heard which ranged from a few
which stood little chance of consideration, let alone enactment (e.g.,
return to the election of United States Senators by state legislatures;
reducing the salary of absentee legislators), to others which struck
more responsive chords.40 One of the problem areas to receive a
thorough review was the role of standing committees (and subcom-
mittees). The seniority system for selecting committee chairmen was
often criticized. The rapid proliferation of subcommittees (174 in
1945; 278 in 1965), and the attendant problem of multiple commit-
tee/subcommittee assignments prompted many suggested remedies,
such as the setting of limits on the creation of new committees, or,
more importantly, subcommittees. Some also believed that an actual
reduction in number through merger of some existing committees
could be achieved. There also seemed to be substantial agreement
that a "bill of rights" for committee members ought to be adopted
which would set definite procedural safeguards on such matters as
the scheduling of committee hearings and meetings, the casting of
proxy votes, and the hiring and supervision of staff personnel. The pro-
ponents claimed a bill of rights would hasten the pace of democratiza-
tion which is already evident in the operation of many, but not all,
standing committees.
In regard to the matter of equalizing the workload of individual
legislators, it was recognized that committee responsibilities were
central to the problem. Obviously, a legislator who holds numerous
40. The committee heard considerable testimony favoring home rule for the District
of Columbia and for lengthening the term of office for House members to four years.
However, the -ommittee -was barred from making recommendations on measures which
were also being considered by the parent Congress. This prevented them from making
proposals on these two controversial issues. For a brief listing by subject of all the
reforms proposed to the group, see the Interim Reports of the Joint Committee on the
Organization of the Congress, S. Rep. No. 426, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); and S.
Rep. No. 948, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). For the entire testimony see the Hearings




committee and subcommittee assignments will be unable to meet all
his responsibilities. The logical solution would be to redistribute
committee assignments of all legislators; but a more practical sug-
gestion would be to relieve the lawmakers of those non-legislative
tasks which seem to command large amounts of their time and atten-
tion. Many proposed that legislators be given additional staff help,
either in their offices or on their committees, or both. Almost all who
discussed the question of increasing the House term of office to four
years were agreed it would allow members to devote more of their
efforts to legislative tasks rather than campaign activities. And the
professional service agencies of the Congress (e.g., Legislative Refer-
ence Service, General Accounting Office) also received some attention
as proposals for increased staff were urged.
An interesting and novel suggestion came from a number of those
who appeared before the committee, that is, the creation of the office
of "ombudsman"-a legislative employee who would investigate all
citizen complaints of administrative malfeasance. The innovation has
evidently been well received in a number of Scandinavian and Euro-
pean countries. The immediate effect of this change would be to shift
the processing of constitutent requests (casework) from the legislator
to this special officer. Others were lukewarm about the proposal
since they believed this is one of the few remaining direct links be-
tween a legislator and his constituents. And finally, the old standby,
an electric voting board to speed up floor proceedings in the House,
was also included in the suggested changes.
Congressional fiscal affairs also attracted considerable attention.
Most of the exchange between committee members and those who
appeared, centered around the problem of the declining role of the
Congress in determining the basic fiscal policies and programs of the
national government. Recommendations were offered for strengthen-
ing the review function of Congress in the taxing and spending fields,
as well as for perhaps recovering some initiatory powers in these
same areas.
In addition to the proposals generated during the public hearings,
the committee members added some of their own. Its professional
staff then conducted the necessary research and study. In closed
working sessions, the committee achieved a consensus on its final
report which was submitted at midsession in 1966. The final recom-
mendations had to have the approval of a majority from each of the
four elements of the committee; thus, the final report contains just
those proposals which attracted bipartisan support. This should in-
crease the prospect for ultimate enactment into law of most of the
proposed changes.
As is often the case with "blue ribbon" study reports, the recom-
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mendations of the Joint Committee reached the floor of Congress at
an inopportune time. Election year preliminaries had won the at-
tention of some legislators; others had returned to their districts to
probe the public pulse or to help their colleagues in reelection bids.
And, at the time of this writing, a number of important measures have
not as yet been disposed of by the Congress. Included in this category
are: several aid to education bills; a number of appropriation meas-
ures; a civil rights proposal; a foreign aid request; and a presidential
proposal to establish a Department of Transportation. The original
prediction by the Senate leaders of a Labor Day adjournment proved
too optimistic, and the date was later postponed until October 15.
The schedule was rendered even more uncertain when the President in
September asked for legislative authorization to suspend certain tax
benefits which were earlier extended to the business community. It
is not surprising, then, that the proposals to reorganize the Congress
lost a good deal of the priority they originally commanded. This does
not mean, however, that all action on the final report has ceased. It
may be that the report will be woven into the crowded agenda or
perhaps postponed until the next session. At any rate, a review of
the final committee recommendations follows.41
Included in the category of recommended changes which would
have wide influence on future legislative operations are those dealing
with fiscal and committee activities. The committee recommended
that Congress make a further effort at achieving the caliber of ex-
pertise in fiscal procedures which currently exists in the executive
branch. Some suggested steps in this direction included: (1) the
streamlining of the legislative audit agency, the General Accounting
Office; (2) an annual review of the underlying fiscal policies of the
executive budget through appearances by the Director of the Budget,
the Treasury Secretary and the head of the Council of Economic Ad-
visers before the Appropriations Committee in each House; and (3)
the creation, on each standing committee, of a review specialist who
would examine the operation of the various administrative agencies,
bureaus, and the like, in order to evaluate their performance on a
continuous basis. The committee acknowledged the failure of the
"legislative budget" provisions of the 1946 Act and suggested its re-
peal. The members were agreed that if these changes were accepted
the legislature would then be better able to meet its responsibilities
in the fiscal-review-and-oversight field.
In the area of standing committee activities, the group was not as
convinced as many who appeared that committee chairmen ought to
41. For the entire listing, which also includes the views of the committee members,
see Final Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress, S. Rep.
No. 1414, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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be selected on a nonseniority basis. Rather, they suggested that the
"bill of rights" for committee members be adopted. This would have
the effect of acknowledging that a chairman is empowered to direct
his committee's activities, but that he is also subject to a check by a
majority of its members. In attempting to equalize the legislative
workload of committees and individual members, the committee sug-
gested a number of changes. Committee jurisdiction would be re-
aligned so as to dovetail more closely with the jurisdiction of the
agencies they oversee in the executive-administrative branch. For
instance, the yearly expenditure of ten billion dollars on educational
programs was recognized to be sufficiently important to warrant
creation of a separate education committee in each House. This
would require a renaming of the current House Education and Labor
Committee. In recognition of the increased scope of urban and hous-
ing affairs (and the decreased emphasis on banking and currency
matters), the committee recommended to both the Senate and the
House the retitling of the Committees on Banking and Currency to
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.
The above alternations in committee jurisdiction would help to even
out the workload of the standing committees. In addition, the re-
formers were aware that some adjustment was necessary in the alloca-
tion of committee assignments to individual members, especially in
the Senate. They proposed that a limit of two major and one minor
(or joint, select or special) committee assignments be established for
all Senators, with these additional restrictions: the Appropriations,
Armed Services, Finance and Foreign Relations Committees were
to be designated as exclusive committees, and no one would be allowed
to serve on more than one of them. In addition, no Senator could be
chairman of more than one committee, or more than one subcom-
mittee on a major committee. The Joint Committee members lost
some of their courage when they suggested that these restrictions
not be made retroactive; and they thus avoided the problem of
stripping some current members of the posts they have gradually
accumulated.
In order to strengthen the research arm of the Congress the com-
mittee agreed upon several needed improvements. The Legislative
Reference Service would be renamed the Legislative Research Service
to emphasize the role it actually performs; individual members would
be allowed to hire a Washington "legislative assistant" to relieve the
congressman of some of his committee and floor tasks; and regular
standing committees would be authorized to increase by two the
number of their professional researchers so that all would then be
entitled to at least twelve research-clerical employees.
And lastly, a number of miscellaneous recommendations won the
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support of the Joint Committee. One change would update the 1946
lobby control law by requiring more lobbyists to register. It was also
recommended that the House create a committee on ethics and stand-
ards to handle any claims concerning misconduct of House members,
similar to the Senate group which was set up in the wake of the Bobby
Baker case. In addition, the group proposed that the legislature either
adhere to the existing law, and adjourn by July 31, or formally extend
the session by resolution. In the event the latter course of action
occurs (as seems likely), the month of August would become a mid-
session recess. They deemed this necessary since accomplishing the
business of the public has required longer and longer sessions. The
month-long vacation would reputedly have a healthy effect on all
concerned and perhaps eliminate some of the brief recesses which are
now frequently called.
One recommendation of the Joint Committee stands out in regard
to future reorganization efforts. This is the proposal to establish a
permanent Joint Committee on Congressional Operations. The mem-
bers of the Monroney-Madden Committee were evidently aware they
might be charged with trying to convert themselves into a continuing
body,42 and proposed that an entirely new body be created. The
committee recommended the new body be filled chiefly by members
of the regular Operations, Rules and Administration Committees in
order to take advantage of the experience of these legislators in
procedural affairs. If created, it would have the responsibility for
keeping the Congress up to date in organizational matters.
A more important aspect of this recommendation is that this body
could assume the task of sponsoring the proposals of the Monroney-
Madden Committee in the 90th Congress in the event action on the
final report is postponed.4 3 This would be a graceful way to recognize
the importance of the work of the current committee, while at the
same time, an institutional device would be created which would
enable the Congress to reorganize itself whenever the need arises.
Regardless of the way in which the current uncertainty is resolved,
the continuing necessity for an effective legislature in democratic
42. This has occurred in the past when certain special committees have sought
permanent status.
43. It has become increasingly difficult to predict what the fate of the reorganization
effort will be in 1966. In the House, the Joint Committee's recommendations were in-
corporated in a bill introduced by Representative Madden. This measure is now resting
in the Rules Committee; it was referred to this body on August 18. The Senate, on
August 26, extended the life of its part of the Joint Committee until March 31, 1967.
In addition, it also appears that the Congress might be called into special session after
the November election. Thus, floor action could conceivably be arranged either in
1966 or 1967, with events seeming to dictate a postponement until the later date.
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societies has been aptly stated by Professor George Galloway, a life-
long student of congressional affairs:
Representative government has broken down or disappeared in other
countries. Here in the U.S. it remains on trial. Its survival may well de-
pend upon its ability to cope quickly and adequately with the difficult prob-
lems of a dangerous world. Congress is the central citadel of American
democracy and our chief defense against dictatorship. Hence the importance
of congressional reorganization and of further steps toward strengthening
our national legislature. 44
44. Galloway, supra note 2, at 68.
